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Abstract 
According to recently developed models of trade with imperfect competition and heterogeneous 
firms, lower trade costs increase bilateral trade not only through a rise in the mean value of 
individual shipments (the intensive margin of trade), but also through an increase in the number 
of exporting firms (the extensive margin of trade). The main aim of this paper is to provide new 
empirical evidence of the effects of the Euro-Mediterranean (EuroMed) agreements on both 
margins of trade. Using highly disaggregated export data for four North African countries 
(Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia) and two Middle East countries (Jordan, Lebanon) over 
the period from 1995 to 2008, we estimate the impact of the EuroMed agreements on both trade 
margins and we provide empirical evidence of the validity of the theoretical predictions. Results 
indicate that only the North African countries enjoyed a positive and significant effect of the 
Barcelona process on their exports to the four biggest countries in the European Union.  
KEYWORDS: Euro-Mediterranean agreements, trade integration, intensive and extensive 
margins. 
JEL CODES: F10  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
A growing economic literature has recently underlined the importance of export diversification 
as part of an export led growth strategy. For many developing countries export diversification is 
conceived as the progression from traditional to non-traditional exports. By providing a broader 
base of exports, diversification can lower instability in export earnings, expand export revenues 
and enhance economic growth through many channels (Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 1997; Gutiérrez 
de Piñeres and Ferrantino, 1997).  In light of the success of the Asian “Tigers”, it is now widely 
recognized that a successful development strategy involves adopting a number of selective 
measures aimed at reducing transaction costs, improving local business conditions and 
improving market access. Trade negotiations at the bilateral or regional level could help reduce 
market access constraints and open opportunities to tap into regional and global production and 
distribution chains. 
The recent emphasis that trade theories based on heterogeneous firms put on the differentiation 
between the extensive (the number of variety exported) and the intensive margin (the quantity of 
every variety exported) offer a new way to determine the microeconomic foundation of trade 
diversification. Along that line we explore these foundations and particularly the role played by 
preferential trade agreements on the diversification of exports. The main aim of this paper is to 
provide new empirical evidence of the effects of the Euro-Mediterranean (EuroMed) 
agreements on both margins of trade. With this aim a theoretically-justified gravity model is 
estimated with data on exports from four North African countries (Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and 
Tunisia) to the four biggest continental European Countries, Germany, France, Italy and Spain 
from the years 1995 to 2008. In order to offer a point of comparison with Euro-North African 
trade, the model is also estimated for two Middle East countries, Jordan and Lebanon
1
, also 
participating into the EuroMed agreements. With respect to the existing literature our main 
contribution is to disentangle the effects of the Euro-Mediterranean agreements on the intensive 
and extensive margins of trade (Chaney, 2008). The related empirical evidence  shows that 
some European Union (EU) trade preference regimes for developing countries, including the 
EuroMed agreements, have a positive effect on developing countries‟ exports (Persson and 
Wilhelmsson, 2006; Blanes-Cristóbal and Milgram-Baleix, 2010).  Indeed, Blanes-Cristóbal and 
Milgram-Baleix (2010) show that the EuroMed trade liberalization process has a positive effect 
on trade between Spain and Morocco. However, other preference regimes, such as the 
Everything But Arms (EBA) regime, appear to have a non-significant or even negative effect on 
developing countries‟ exports (Gradeva and Martínez-Zarzoso, 2009; Gamberoni, 2007). One of 
the explanations given is that the Rules of Origin (RoO) are more restrictive than those of 
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 We have excluded from our work Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Libya and Mauritania. Israel is 
excluded due to the differences between this economy compared to the other MENA countries, and the 
Palestinian Authority, Libya and Mauritania due to lack of data. 
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previous preference regimes applied to the eligible countries and therefore the regime is 
underutilized. 
Most of the abovementioned studies, with the only exception of Gamberoni (2007), rely on 
trade theories that assume that all products are exported to all destinations. They do not take into 
account the new-new trade theories which consider firm heterogeneity and productivity 
differences among firms to determine what firms are exporters. Based on these theories 
Gamberoni (2007) decomposes the total value of trade into the extensive margin and the 
intensive margin and then estimates the effects of trade preferences on each margin. 
Interestingly, the main findings indicate that the ACP and the EBA regimes decrease trade 
(conditional on trade being present) by 11% and 19% respectively and also that both regimes 
decrease the number of products traded. This later effect implies an anti-diversification bias 
effect of these preferences. Our paper is closely related to the work of Amurgo-Pacheco (2006), 
Gamberoni (2007) and Amurgo-Pacheco and Pierola (2008). However, our empirical model is 
estimated using more recent data. It is built on a more recent and comprehensive methodology 
which follows the decomposition of trade proposed by Hillberry and Hummels (2008) and is 
based on the theoretical model of Chaney (2008).  
Our main hypothesis is that tight rules of origin can be considered as a hidden fixed cost to 
trade. They can limit the use of intermediary goods from countries outside bilateral agreements 
and hence put a fixed and sometimes overwhelming price premium on these goods. According 
to the new-new trade theory a decrease in the fixed cost associated with trade allows new firms 
(less productive than the one already present on the export market) to enter in exporting 
activities. A growth of the extensive margin of trade should follow.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the two phases of the EuroMed 
agreements and the related stylized facts. Section 3 presents the theoretical framework and 
Section 4 presents the main hypotheses of the study. Section 5 presents the data, the estimated 
model and the main results. Section 6 concludes. 
2. THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN AGREEMENTS 
In 1995 the European Union (EU) and fourteen countries of the Mediterranean basin decided to 
commit to a deeper economic integration by signing “new generation” integration agreements. 
This commitment was named the Barcelona Process. Fourteen years later seven of the signing 
countries have already enforced the agreement (Table 1), two of them have already joined the 
EU (Malta and Cyprus), two are candidates (Croatia and Turkey), and a new country, Libya, has 
joined the process in 2000. Table 1 presents a summary of the trade integration process between 
the EU and the Euro-Mediterranean countries. 
Table 1. Evolution of trade integration in the Euro-Mediterranean region 
 
 
5 
The first cooperation agreement including a preferential trade agreement (PTA) between the EU 
and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries dates from the end of the 1970‟s. The 
PTA signed was asymmetric since the EU removed the taxes charged on the industrial products 
originating from the signing countries, whilst the signing countries maintained trade barriers in 
order to protect their developing industries and to keep revenues from customs duties. Trade 
relations between Mauritania, Libya and Syria and the EU are today still regulated by the 
agreements signed 30 years ago. For the rest of the countries the new agreements add two 
important novelties. Firstly, the agreements open MENA markets to EU‟s products. The signing 
countries have to relax all tariffs paid on industrial products imported from the EU over a period 
of twelve years
2
. The agreement specifically stipulates the schedule for each type of product. 
Secondly, rules of origin that apply to the signing countries have been modified. In the 
preceding(or previous) agreements these rules were particularly narrow (Hoekman, 1998, 
Francois et al., 2005), since only products entirely made in the signing country or incorporating 
spare parts from the EU could enter free of duty into the EU.  
To understand the impact of the EuroMed process on exports from the Mediterranean countries 
to the EU we have to focus first on the evolution over time of the signed agreements. We 
differentiate between the effects resulting from an increase of the EU openness to the 
Mediterranean products inherent to the process (first stage) and the effects that result from an 
increase in openness of the Mediterranean countries to European products (second stage). 
Industrial products originating from the Mediterranean countries are authorized to enter free of 
customs duties into the European Union since 1978. Only marginal changes have occurred since 
then. For example, some provisions concerning the United Kingdom and Ireland in 1978 have 
disappeared). It is mainly in agricultural products that the EU opens its frontiers within the 
framework of the Barcelona Process.  
The first evaluations of the economic effects of the Euro-Mediterranean agreements were 
particularly controversial. Deardorff et al (1996), Deardorff (1999) and Hoekman and Konan 
(1999, 2005) stated that the outcome of these agreements could be negative for the MENA 
countries in terms of trade, growth and revenue, at least in the short term. The authors based this 
statement on the loss of revenue from import duties that the MENA countries will suffer 
following the agreements and on the diversion of consumption induced by increasing imports 
from the EU. It is worth noting that these authors disregarded the effects of the new and more 
flexible rules of origin included in the agreements. Since exports of industrial goods to the EU 
were already free of tariffs before 1995, we pay particular attention to the effects of changes in 
the RoO adopted in the new agreements. The determination of the geographic origin of the 
products is crucial and could hinder all attempts of real integration. In this sense, the RoO 
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adopted during the Barcelona process have changed in comparison to the previous post-1978 
agreements. According to these, a product that is wholly obtained or completely produced 
within one country the product originates from that country. For a product which has been 
produced in more than one country the product is assumed to have origin in the country where 
the last substantial transformation took place. The EU‟s most commonly used rule is that a 
substantial transformation takes place when there is a change in the product tariff classification 
line. An alternative criterion is that the value of the intermediate good originated from outside 
the PTA has to stay under a certain percentage (often between 40 and 50%) of the value of the 
final good, or that a particular production process is used to transform the product. The main 
novelty introduced by the new agreements is the so-called diagonal cumulation, which is one of 
the three main types of cumulation. The other two forms are bilateral and full cumulation. 
Bilateral cumulation means that two countries within the agreement can use each other‟s 
materials without any limitation. All PTAs allow for bilateral cumulation. Diagonal cumulation 
means that materials originated from a third country also linked by an agreement to one of the 
signing countries could be used without any limits by the other signing country. If Spain for 
example has a PTA with Iceland and signs a PTA with Morocco which includes the possibility 
of diagonal cumulation between Iceland and Morocco, intermediate products from Iceland used 
as intermediates in a Moroccan good are considered as originating from Morocco. Finally, full 
cumulation allows intermediate processing to be split in any way between the parties of the PTA 
provided that, when added together all inputs used are sufficient to fulfill the RoO (Augier et al. 
2005; Karray 2003). Full cumulation is currently operated by the European Economic Area 
(EEA) and between the EU and Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. Table A.4 shows how the rules 
concerning the cumulation possibilities have evolved over time for the Mediterranean countries 
(Protocol 3, 4 and 6 of the Euro-Mediterranean  agreements ).  
Moreover, the Barcelona Process encourages the Mediterranean countries to further integrate 
the service sectors (transport and finance sector for example) and to homogenize their 
procedures (standardization, metrology, quality controls, and conformity assessment) with the 
EU members. These measures should decrease the transaction costs between the EU and its 
partners. Except for the signing of the open sky agreement between the EU and Morocco in 
2007, little progress has been made in this area (European Commission Country Reports on 
Neighborhood Policy 2004, 2005, 2008). Finally, the European products will have duty free 
access to the South and East Mediterranean markets after the negotiated transition period, a 
twelve year period during which the customs duties are progressively abolished. 
3. HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS AND THE TWO MARGINS OF TRADE 
A major concern in the traditional literature on the formation of preferential trade agreements 
has been whether these areas generate welfare gains for the individual countries that engage in 
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these processes. Since the 1950s (Viner 1950) many authors have contributed to this debate, 
especially in the 1990s when studies based on the gravity model proliferated (Frankel et al. 
1995, 1996, 1998; Soloaga and Winters, 2001). Indeed, the effect of PTAs on trade has been 
commonly analysed using the gravity model of trade, with the dependent variable being the 
aggregate value of trade between two countries and modelling the agreements with dummy 
variables. Some recent studies for aggregated trade are Carrère (2006), Magee (2008) and 
Martínez-Zarzoso et al. (2009). Most of these recent papers rely on a model that assumes 
iceberg trade costs
3
 and symmetric firms. In this setting, consumers buy positive quantities of all 
varieties and aggregated trade values react to trade cost reductions in exactly the same way as 
firm-level quantities and values.  
The theoretical models used to generate the gravity equation usually assume homogeneous firms 
within a country and consumer love of variety. These two assumptions imply that all products 
are traded to all destinations. However, empirical observation indicates that few firms export 
and exporting firms commonly sell in a limited number of countries. This empirical fact has led 
to the development of the so-called new-new trade theories based on firm heterogeneity in 
productivity and fixed costs of exporting (Melitz, 2003). These newer theories predict the 
existence of a productivity threshold for each country that firms have to exceed in order to 
become exporters. As a result two margins of trade emerge: the extensive margin  and the 
intensive margin the size of its exports. Chaney (2008) shows that a higher elasticity of 
substitution makes the intensive margin more sensitive to changes in trade barriers, whereas it 
makes the extensive margin less sensitive. The reasoning is as follows: when goods are highly 
differentiated (the elasticity of substitution is low), the demand for each individual variety is 
relatively insensitive to changes in trade costs and so, trade barriers have little impact on the 
intensive margin of trade. On the contrary, as trade barriers decrease firms with a lower 
productivity level are also able to enter into the markets. The extensive margin is therefore 
strongly affected by trade barriers when the elasticity of substitution is low. The reverse holds 
when the elasticity of substitution is high. 
In this context we can express the quantity of a variety from origin country i to destination 
country j (qij) as 
 










j
iji
jij
P
tp
Eq ~

        (1) 
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 Iceberg trade costs mean that for each good that is exported a certain fraction melts away during the trip 
as if an iceberg were shipped across the ocean. 
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where Ej denotes country j‟s total expenditure on the differentiated product, (pitij) is the price of 
product i at destination j, pi varies across destinations due to positive iceberg transport costs, tij. 
 


i
ijij tpP
)1(~ 
 is a price index and  is the elasticity of substitution, which is constant 
across varieties
4
 (CES).
5
 
Since the quantity traded of each variety is in most cases not observable, adding the two 
assumptions that, a) all varieties in the origin are symmetric and b) the destinations will 
consume all the varieties in equal quantity, allows multiplying the quantity per variety (qij) by 
prices (pi) and by the number of varieties (ni) to obtain total trade values. The outcome is  
 



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


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ijijiiij
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      (2) 
In equation (2) the quantity per variety is the only component of Tij that has bilateral variation. 
Following Hillberry and Hummels (2008), we are able to examine each of the components of 
total trade values in a more flexible way since not only data on quantities are available, but also 
prices and the range of products vary across origin and destinations. Therefore we need to relax 
some of the assumptions made above. Prices may vary across destinations if the elasticity of 
substitution is not constant or if transport costs are not iceberg costs (Hummels and Skiba, 
2004). Consequently for a given year t, we can assume: 
ijijijij qpnT           (3) 
At least three reasons have been suggested in the literature to explain why the range of trade 
products might vary with trade cost. First, goods produced in different locations (origin and 
destination) can be homogeneous. In this case, if production costs in origin and destination are 
very similar or the trade costs are sufficiently large, these goods will not be traded. Additionally, 
the higher transport costs are, the more likely products are to be non-traded goods. Second, if 
goods are differentiated by country of origin, each country producing a different variety has to 
incur a fixed cost to sell the product in each destination country. Therefore, not all the varieties 
will be shipped to each destination and the number of varieties traded will depend negatively on 
the magnitude of trade costs. Finally, not all varieties are consumer goods. Intermediate inputs 
that are used in the production of final goods would only be exported to destination j if country j 
produces the final good. Due to “just in time” production processes intermediates are more 
likely to be traded over short distances. We focus on the first and second explanations and 
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 Varieties refer to different products that are substitutes in consumption. 
5
 The constant elasticity of substitution (CES) assumption is made in order to obtain a simple model that 
is easily derived and with testable implications. 
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assume that both, the number of varieties and the quantity traded are negatively affected by 
trade costs. 
The methodology we use to decompose aggregate value of trade into its various components is 
based on Hillberry and Hummels (2008). Unique shipments are indexed by s and the total value 
of shipments from country i to country j is given by 



ijN
s
s
ij
s
ijij QPT
1
         (4) 
where Nij is the number of unique shipments (extensive margin of trade) and ijPQ  is the 
average value per shipment (the intensive margin). Hence, total trade value is decomposed first 
into extensive and intensive margin 
ijijij
QPNT           (5) 
where 
 
ij
s
ij
N
s
s
ij
ij
N
QP
QP
ij
  1  
Since there can be multiple unique shipments within an origin-destination country pair, the 
number of shipments can be further decomposed into the number of distinct SITC products 
shipped, Nij
k
, and the number of average shipments between a country of origin and a 
destination country, Nij
F
. Nij
F
>1 means that we observe more than 1 unique shipment per 
commodity travelling from country i to country j. 
F
ij
k
ij NNN ij          (6) 
The average value per shipment can also be further decomposed into average price and average 
quantity per shipment: 
   
ijij
ij
N
s ij
N
s ij
N
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ij
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1
     (7) 
By substituting equations (6) and (7) into (5) we can decompose total trade between two 
countries into four different components: 
ijij
F
ij
k
ij QPNNT ij         (8) 
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The quantity measure is tons for all commodities. Using a common unit allows us to aggregate 
over different products and compare prices (import unit values) across all commodities. 
We now have two decomposition levels. The first is given by equation (5) and decomposes total 
trade value into the range of products traded and the average value per product. The second, 
given by equation (8), decomposes these two components into another two each: the number of 
distinct SITC goods shipped, the number of average shipments between a country of origin and 
a destination country, and average price and average quantity, respectively. Taking logs for the 
first and second level decompositions and adding the time dimension, t we obtain: 
ijtijtijt
QPNT lnlnln         (9) 
ijtijt
F
ijt
k
ijt QPNNT ijt lnlnlnlnln       (10) 
In the empirical analysis, we analyze how each of the components of equation (10) co-varies 
with distance and with other trade-related costs. The variable of interest is trade cost reductions 
induced by trade liberalisation between the European Union and the Maghreb countries 
considered. Before specifying the empirical model, in the next section we state a number of 
hypotheses that are based on recent theories of international trade under imperfect competition 
and heterogeneous firms.  
4. MAIN HYPOTHESES 
The first hypothesis to be tested is that the EuroMed process has positive effects on the 
extensive and intensive margins of trade. Melitz (2003) introduced firm heterogeneity in a 
general equilibrium model of international trade. Chaney (2008) extended Melitz‟s model to 
multiple countries with asymmetric trade barriers. This model predicts that, for aggregated 
bilateral trade flows, the elasticity of exports with respect to trade barriers is larger than in the 
absence of firm heterogeneity and larger than the elasticity for each individual firm. A reduction 
of variable cost has two effects. First, it increases the size of exports of each exporter and 
second, it allows new firms to enter the market. Therefore, the extensive margin amplifies the 
impact of a reduction of variable costs on trade. The results obtained in the present paper 
support this first hypothesis and show that the EuroMed process has a positive effect on both, 
the extensive and intensive margins of trade.  
The second hypothesis is that the effect of the EuroMed agreements may differ for different 
sectors. In more homogeneous sectors, exports are very sensitive to changes in transportation 
costs because many firms enter and exit when variable costs change. The elasticity of exports 
with respect to variable costs does not depend on the elasticity of substitution between goods. 
However, the elasticity of exports with respect to fixed costs is negatively related to the 
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elasticity of substitution. This is in contrast with models with a representative firm, according to 
which the elasticity of exports with respect to transport costs equals the elasticity of substitution 
minus one. Further, with respect to the two margins of trade, Chaney (2008) shows that in the 
presence of firm heterogeneity, the extensive margin and the intensive margin are affected in 
different directions by the elasticity of substitution. The impact of trade barriers is strong in the 
intensive margin for high elasticities of substitution (homogeneous products), whereas the 
impact is mild on the extensive margin. The author proves that the dampening effect on the 
extensive margin dominates the magnifying effect on the intensive margin. The results obtained 
in the present paper support this second hypothesis since the effect on the intensive margin is 
stronger for product categories for which the elasticity of substitution is higher.  
The third hypothesis predicts that the effect of the EuroMed agreements differs across countries. 
The production structure and specialization pattern differs across Mediterranean countries. If 
one country is specialized in homogeneous or referenced goods, then it should be more 
dependent on price competition and the new agreements should have an effect on the quantity 
exported. Otherwise, a country which is specialized in more sophisticated products may find 
more opportunities to diversify with the new agreements.
6
  
The fourth hypothesis predicts that the RoO adopted with the Barcelona process could have a 
positive effect on trade of final goods or could induce an effect on trade on intermediated goods 
and promote the creation of a production network. Augier et al. (2005) point out that moving to 
a system of diagonal cumulation of origin widens the possible source of intermediate suppliers 
to all those countries which are part of that system. Therefore, exporters of the Mediterranean 
countries could use intermediate goods from more efficient partners inside the agreement or 
from the rest of the world (RoW).
7
 Consequently, if RoO adopted with the first phase of the 
Barcelona process are more flexible than the previously existent, exports from the 
Mediterranean countries to EU should increase. Furthermore, the new RoO adopted may also 
have consequences on the imports of intermediate products from the RoW. Results in Table 8 
support this hypothesis.  In relation to this, the fifth hypothesis states that the effect of the 
EuroMed trade liberalization process may differ across sectors (Table 9).  
With regard to the second phase of the Barcelona Process, the fact that PTA agreements 
between the EU and the Mediterranean countries entered into force implies that the European 
products will have duty free access to the South and East Mediterranean markets after the 
negotiated transition periods. If trade barriers applied to intermediate goods imported from the 
EU into these countries are reduced and eventually eliminated, those intermediates became less 
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 See Table A.1 in the Appendix for specialization patterns. 
7
 As one of the Mediterranean countries could use intermediate goods from one of his partner in the 
agreement as it is its own goods it let more “space” for using intermediate goods from the rest of the 
world. 
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expensive and final goods produced by Maghreb and Mashrek exporters could be sold at more 
competitive prices. Consequently, the end of customs duties at the frontier of the South and East 
Mediterranean markets could imply an increase in exports of these countries due to the lower 
costs of imported inputs. The seventh hypothesis analyses the effect of the second phase of the 
Barcelona Process and states that an increase in intermediate imports from the EU has a positive 
effect on Mediterranean countries‟ exports.  
Figure 1 summarizes the main expected effects of the Barcelona Process on trade between the 
EU and the South and East Mediterranean countries. 
Figure 1. The effect of the Barcelona Process on EuroMed trade 
In the next section we first estimate the overall impact of the Barcelona Process. Since we are 
particularly interested in the way the Barcelona Process could create trade, we investigate 
whether the process impact exports through the creation of new trade (more varieties exported) 
or through the exploitation of previously existent comparative advantages (increase in the 
average quantity exported of the existing flows) or both. Next, we aim to specifically 
disentangle whether those liberalization effects are due to a change in the RoO or to the 
liberalization of imported inputs from the EU. These results will contribute to the understanding 
of the literature on the potential effect of the new series of bilateral Euro-Mediterranean 
agreements. 
5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
5.1.  Data, sources and variables 
The main data source is Eurostat. We use the external trade detailed database which covers both 
extra- and intra-EU trade. In particular, extra-EU trade statistics provide data for the trade in 
goods between the MENA countries and four Member States (France, Italy, Germany and 
Spain). The products are classified according to the Standard International Trade Classification 
(SITC) codes at the SITC 5-digit level. Only manufactured products are taken into consideration 
(categories 5 to 8, see Table A.2 in the Appendix). Income and population data are taken from 
the World Development Indicators Database 2008 and distance and colonial links from CEPII. 
Table A.3 in the Appendix provides a summary of the data and sources used in this paper. 
The extensive and intensive margin, average price and average quantity of products exported 
from the MENA to France, Italy, Germany and Spain over the period 1995-2008 are calculated 
by using export values and export quantities. We count the number of products (5-digits SITC) 
exported within each 2-digits SITC sector from each exporter to each importer yearly. To give 
an example, out of a total of 2678 products categories listed in 1999, Algeria exported only 23 
different products to Germany. This number increased to 40 in 2008. Therefore, only a 1.5 
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percent of the existent products were traded. The total number of products exported to Spain 
rose from 79 to 90, representing a 3 percent of the products listed.  
The variables Input_EU and Input_RoW are used as proxies for intermediate inputs imported 
from the main countries of the European Union (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United 
Kingdom) or alternatively, from the main producers of the RoW (Japan, South Korea, Honk 
Kong, USA). The source for these two variables is the OECD database on exports and, in 
particular, we use exports from the main countries of the European Union and the RoW to each 
Mediterranean country of Machinery and Equipment (Sector 84 of the harmonized system 
commodity classification). Summary statistics of the variables are presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Summary statistics 
 
5.2. The estimated model 
We are interested in knowing whether the stated hypotheses hold for trade flows in the 
Mediterranean region. In order to test some of the abovementioned predictions, the estimating 
equation takes the following form: 
ijktijkijkt
ijkttkijt
ijjtitjtitijkt
where
ColonyFTA
DPOPPOPGPDGDPX






76
543210 lnlnlnlnlnln
 
         (11) 
where γk and λt are industry (at two digit level) and year fixed effects  εijkt is a two-component 
error term and ln(Xijkt) is in turn the log of the average value per shipment (intensive margin), 
and the log of the range of shipments (extensive margin), as described in equation (9). GDPit 
and GDPjt denote Gross Domestic Product of the importer and the exporter country in year t, 
respectively and POPij and POPjt denote the respective populations. Dij is the geographical 
distance between the trading-countries‟ capitals and PTAijt denote Free Trade Agreements 
dummies that take the value of one when both countries have implemented a cooperation 
agreement in year t, zero otherwise. Finally, colony is a dummy that takes the value of one when 
the trading partner had a colonial relationship in the past, zero otherwise. Since OLS is linear, 
the coefficient on total imports will be equal to the sum of the coefficients on the two margins. 
A further decomposition can be done, using each of the components in equation (10) as 
dependent variable in equation (11). 
To take into account particular aspects of the agreement, an extended model is specified in 
which the PTA variable in equation (11) is replaced by two variables that describe the type of 
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cumulation rule and that incorporates imports of intermediate products from the EU and from 
the rest of the world The extended model is given by, 
 
 
           (12) 
, where D_Cumulation takes the value of one when the RoO allow diagonal cumulation with the 
other MENA countries, zero otherwise; Pan-EuroMed_RoO takes the value of one when a 
country has full cumulation RoO, zero otherwise; MIEUit denotes importer machinery from the 
EU and MIRoWit denotes importer machinery from the RoW. Next, we estimate an extended 
model for all countries and for each sector. We are not able to estimate the extended model for 
each country since our variables imported inputs from the EU and from RoW are country 
specific. 
5.3. Main results 
 The integration effects are jointly estimated for the six Mediterranean countries considered. The 
three-dimensional structure of our data allows us to control for unobservable heterogeneity in 
several ways. After testing a number of competing specifications, the selected specification 
includes exporter, importer and sectoral effects jointly considered as random, and year and 
industry effects specified as fixed effects.  In order to control for the remaining unobserved 
heterogeneity we add the averages of the time variant variables as additional explanatory 
variables, as suggested by Mundlak (1978). We also considered adding population variables or 
GDP per capita for exporters and importers, and the result concerning the effect of our target 
variable remain unchanged. The estimated model is also corrected for autocorrelation of first 
order by adding a first order autoregressive term. The fixed effects results are also shown in the 
appendix (Table A.4). In addition, in the spirit of Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) we also 
estimated the model with country-and-time fixed effects in addition to the dyadic bilateral 
effects, the results show positive and significant coefficients that are higher in magnitude (Table 
A.6). 
Table 3 shows the results for total trade and for each margin of trade. The dependent variable in 
Column (1) is the logarithm of the total value exported from the MENA to the four importing 
European countries. In Column (2) and (3) the dependent variable is each of the components of 
Equation (9) respectively, that is, the extensive and the intensive margin of trade. In Column (4) 
and (5) the dependent variables are the two last components of equation (10) that represent the 
decomposition of the intensive margin into average quantity and average price respectively.  
ijktijkijkt
ijkttkitit
ijtijjtitijkt
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For the whole set of Mediterranean countries, Table 3 show that the coefficient of our variable 
of interest, the implementation of a PTA between the MENA countries and the EU, is positive 
and statistically significant for total trade (column 1) and also for the intensive margin (column 
3), whereas it is positive but not significant for the extensive margin. Turning to the second 
level decomposition of equation (10), the first component of average value per shipment 
(column 4 - Table 3), average quantities shipped are higher after the PTA entered into force, 
whereas the PTA variable is not significant when the average price component is used as 
dependent variable (column 5 - Table 3). These results show a weak but insignificant 
diversification effect (Hypothesis 1), especially if we rely on the fixed effects‟ results shown in 
Table A.5. Such diversification involves shipping existing exports to new foreign destinations or 
shipping a good abroad for the first time. With respect to the additional explanatory variables, 
we obtained the expected positive and statistically significant effect of the GDP of the importing 
countries on total trade. Geographical distance presents a negative and significant coefficient, 
except for the average price, which shows a positive distance coefficient (this result has also 
been obtained in results for a sample of Latin American countries, see Martínez-Zarzoso and 
Wilmsmeier, 2010; Hillberry and Hummels, 2008). The decomposition of the influence of 
distance on trade shows a greater effect on the intensive margin (column 3 – Table 3), for all 
industrial products. About 33% of the distance effect on trade works through the extensive 
margin (i.e. 0.382/(0.382+0.774); 67% of the increase in disaggregate trade flows comes from 
larger average shipments. Previous research finds the opposite picture, with the extensive 
margin being more important than the intensive margin (Hillberry and Hummels, 2008; Mayer 
and Ottaviano, 2008). Our results are very different to Mayer and Ottaviano (2008), who 
analyze French and Belgian individual export flows and show that 75% of the distance effect on 
trade comes from the extensive margin. Finally, sharing colonial links and language fosters 
exports from MENA countries to the EU; 37% of the increase in disaggregate trade flows comes 
from the extensive margin (a wider variety of products traded), whereas 63% of the increase in 
disaggregate trade flows comes from larger average shipments (row 5, Table 3). 
Table 3. Main results for all countries and sectors 
Summarizing, these results consistently show that the new PTA agreements signed between the 
MENA countries and the European Union have fostered exports from these countries to some of 
their main European partners. Furthermore, we find that this increase in exports has been mainly 
channeled by an increase of the intensive margin of trade. The MENA countries export more of 
the products they already exported in the past. This fact is in line with what we know of the 
industrial structure of these countries and with the explanation proposed by Chaney (2008) 
concerning how reductions in trade costs influence the two margins of trade. MENA are mainly 
producers of goods with low technological content, which are highly substitutable on the 
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international market. In this case, Chaney (2008) states that the main impact of a decrease in 
trade barriers will be through the intensive margin.  
In order to test the second hypothesis, the effect of the bilateral PTAs on trade is also estimated 
for each sector (at one digit-level SITC).  Table 4 shows the main results for the PTA variable 
for each sector of the SITC
8
. The different sectors are not equally impacted by the agreements. 
Concerning the effect on total trade (column 1), the coefficient of the PTA variable is significant 
and positive signed for sectors 5 and 6 (chemicals and manufactured goods classified chiefly by 
material), whereas it is positive signed and non-significant for the sectors 7 and 8 (machinery 
and transport equipment and miscellaneous manufactured articles). The effect on the extensive 
margin is only positive and significant for sector 5; it is positive and significant for the intensive 
margin for sectors 5 and 6. The results are in line with the idea that the main changes induce by 
the PTA come through the intensive margin of trade.  
Table 4. Main results for each product category 
 
These results seem consistent with the explanation proposed by trade theorists: for more 
homogeneous products (Sectors 5 and 6) a greater impact of a reduction of trade costs through 
the intensive margin is expected. In fact two of the exporters considered, Tunisia and Morocco, 
are important exporters of fertilizers (SITC 56) and also of textile and leather products (SITC 
61, and 65) and Algeria of organic chemical derived from petroleum (SITC 51). All these 
products are not highly differentiated products. With respect to the extensive margin, we 
observe negative but no significant effects for sectors 6, 7 and 8, showing perhaps some sort of 
industry restructuration that follows trade liberalization and lead to an exit of the market to the 
less competitive firms. 
In order to test the third hypothesis, which predicts that the effect of the EuroMed differs across 
countries, we estimate equation (11) for every MENA country as exporter. Table 5 shows our 
main results. The effect of the PTA is positive and significant for total exports for four countries 
with the exceptions of Jordan and Lebanon for which the coefficient is positive but small and 
not significant. For Egypt and Morocco the total effect seems to occur through both margins of 
trade, whereas for Algeria and Tunisia most of the effect goes through the intensive margin. 
Interestingly, for Egypt and Tunisia the second level decomposition shows a negative effect of 
the agreement on the average prices which could be showing the effect of more competition in 
the local markets. 
Table 5. Main results for each country 
 
                                                          
8
 Full results are available upon request from the authors. 
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5.4. Disentangling PTA effects 
In this section the results of estimating the extended model given by equation (12) are presented 
and discussed. With this model we aim to test for our fourth hypothesis which states that RoO 
adopted in the first phase of the Barcelona process could have had a positive effect on exports of 
final goods due to an increase in imports of intermediate goods. Table 6 shows that the effect of 
diagonal cumulation on total trade is significant and positive and most part of this effect works 
through the intensive margin of trade. The coefficients for the Pan Euro Med RoO are 
significant and positively signed for the extensive margin of trade, but no significant effect is 
found on the intensive margin.  
With respect to the variables related to a possible “production network” effect, the coefficient of 
the variable inputs from the EU has a positive effect on total trade, but this effect is not 
statistically significant at conventional levels. Our hypothesis that a higher level of exports 
could be a consequence of a more integrated production network cannot be confirmed. 
However, looking at the second level decomposition of the intensive margin this variable has a 
positive and significant effect on average prices which is compensated by a negative and 
significant effect on average quantities exported. This neutralizes the non-statistically 
significant effect on the intensive margin of trade. The coefficient of inputs imported from the 
RoW is negative for total trade and also for the number and the quantity of goods exported. This 
could possibly indicate that a displacement of third-countries imports in favor of EU imported 
inputs has generated an anti-diversification effect on total exports to the EU. 
Table 6. Results extended model 
As a further refinement of our estimation we also considered a model that controls for possible 
unobserved heterogeneity that is sector-specific. We added fixed effects for each exporter-time-
sector and importer-time-sector, at 1-digit level. In this way we control for possible 
misspecification due to the exclusion of sector and country specific variables that are time 
variant and could be correlated with the error term. Such as, sectoral value added in case of the 
exporter-time-sector effects or consumer biases in case of the importer-time-sector effects. The 
results of the extended model are presented in Table 7. The results are even more promising, 
showing a higher effect on trade that mainly comes through the intensive margin, but that in 
case of the change in rules of origin also affects positively the extensive margin. In addition, the 
variable imported inputs from the EU shows now a positive and significant effect on the 
extensive margin, pointing towards the existence of a “network” effect. 
Table 7. Extended model with dyadic fixed effect and country-sector-and-time 
effects 
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The fifth hypothesis states that the effect of the change in RoO may differ across sectors. 
Results shown in Table 8 show that the coefficients for diagonal cumulation are significant and 
positive when total trade and the intensive margin are the dependent variables for exports of 
sectors 5 and 6, whereas the coefficients of the Pan Euro Med RoO are significant and positive 
when the extensive margin of trade is estimated for sector 7, and when the intensive margin of 
trade is estimated for sector 8. Coefficients are also significant for inputs imported from the 
European Union for the same sectors. The coefficients for inputs imported from the RoW are 
significant and negative mainly for sector 8. These results indicate that the adoption of diagonal 
cumulation between the MENA countries have an impact on their exports to Europe mainly 
through the intensive margin of trade, more specifically through the average quantity exported. 
Different are the results for entering in the unified regime of RoO of the European Union (Pan 
Euro Med RoO), for which the main effect on exports comes through the extensive margin. The 
effect of an increase in European imported inputs has an interesting effect for the sectors with 
lower technological content (sectors 5 and 6). It has a negative effect on the average quantity of 
exports but a positive effect on average prices. These results could be interpreted as an increase 
in the quality of the goods produced by MENA countries. Additionally, for sector 7, which has 
the highest technological content, an increase in European imported inputs has a positive and 
significant effect on the extensive margin of trade. With respect to the results for inputs 
imported from the RoW, the abovementioned anti-diversification bias is found for sectors 6, 7 
and 8, meaning perhaps that a decrease in imported inputs form the rest of the world has a 
negative effect on the extensive margin of trade and also contributes to reduce total exports to 
the EU. 
Table 8. Sectoral results extended model 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper the effect of Euro-Mediterranean agreements on international trade is evaluated by 
using disaggregated trade data. These agreements should contribute to modify trade patterns 
between the two shores of the Mediterranean Sea. We apply some of the recently developed 
models of trade (Chaney, 2008) to depict the impact of PTA on the extensive and intensive 
margins of trade. We focus on exports from MENA countries to the four biggest continental 
European economies, Germany, France, Italy and Spain.  
Our first results seem to confirm a positive and significant effect of the new PTAs on exports of 
MENA countries to their main European partners. Moreover, strong differences across countries 
in the effect of the new PTAs are found.  Indeed, empirical evidence indicates that only the 
North African countries enjoy a significant increase in exports associated to the PTA that 
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mainly works through the intensive margin for Algeria, Egypt, and Tunisia and through the 
extensive margin for Morocco.  Diversity of trade patterns between North African and Middle 
East countries could be at the origin of the observed differences. Whereas North African 
countries trade mainly with the European Union, Lebanon and Jordan trade is more oriented 
towards other Middle East countries. Both groups of countries have intensified their 
participation into PTAs, not only with the European Union, but also with the large economies of 
the Gulf region (through the Pan-Arab Free Trade Agreement). In further research, we aim to 
analyze whether PTAs are effective in diversifying the production structure of their members 
and whether this is only the case for countries having strong commercial links before the 
agreement.   
This positive effect of the news PTAs on trade could be due to the new RoO agreed. A plausible 
explanation of the reason why the adoption of new RoO has resulted in the increase of trade is 
that the new rules have allowed the integration of better quality/less expensive intermediate 
goods in production in MENA countries consequently enhancing the demand for these goods in 
European markets. The sectoral result partially confirms this hypothesis, since the effect of an 
increase in the inputs imported from the EU has a positive effect on MENA‟s exports of 
sophisticated manufactured products, with the only exception of chemicals and related products. 
This effect is channeled by an increase of the extensive and intensive margins of trade of 
machinery and transport equipment, by an increase of the extensive margin of manufactured 
goods classified chiefly by material and by an increase of the intensive margin of miscellaneous 
manufactured articles. Further research on more disaggregated products is desirable to know 
whether export diversification is actually a consequence of the change in RoO. 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Acemoglu, D. and Zilibotti, F. (1997) „Was Prometheus unbound by chance? Risk, 
Diversification, and Growth‟, Journal of Political Economy,  45: 709-751 
Amurgo Pacheco, A. (2006) Preferential Trade Liberalization and the Range of Exported 
Products: The Case of the Euro-Mediterranean FTA, HEI Working Papers 18-2006, 
Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies 
Amurgo-Pacheco, A. & Pierola, M. (2008) Patterns of export diversification in developing 
countries : intensive and extensive margins, Policy Research Working Paper Series 
4473, The World Bank 
Gutiérrez de Piñeres, S. and Ferrantino, M. (1997) „Export Diversification and Structural 
Dynamics in the Growth Process: the case of Chile‟, Journal of development 
Economics, 52: 375-391 
 
 
20 
Augier, P., Gasiorek, M and Lai Tong, C. (2005) „The impact of rules of origin on trade flows‟, 
Economic Policy, 43: 567-624 
Baldwin, R. and Taglioni, D. (2006) Gravity for Dummies and Dummies for Gravity Equations, 
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 12516, Cambridge.  
Blanes-Cristóbal, V. and Milgram-Baleix, J. (2010) „Impacto de la liberalización comercial de 
Marruecos sobre las exportaciones por regione‟, Revista de Economía Aplicada 18: 63-
90 
Carrère, C. (2006) „Revisiting the effects of regional trade agreements on trade flows with 
proper specification of the gravity model‟, European Economic Review 2: 223-247 
Chaney, T. (2008) „Distorted Gravity: The Intensive and Extensive Margins of International 
Trade‟, American Economic Review 4: 1707-1721. 
Deardorff, A. (1999) Economic implications of Europe-Maghreb trade agreements. Working 
Papers 442, Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan 
Deardorff, A., D. Brown, and R. Stern (1996) Some economic effects of the free trade 
agreement between Tunisia and the European Union. Working Papers 385, Research 
Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan 
Francois, J. F., M. McQueen, and G. Wignaraja (2005) „European union-developing country 
FTAs: overview and analysis‟, World Development 10: 1545 – 1565. 
Gradeva, K. & Martínez-Zarzoso I. (2009) Trade as Aid: The Role of the EBA-Trade 
Preferences Regime in the Development Strategy, Ibero America Institute for Econ. 
Research (IAI) Discussion Papers 197, Ibero-America Institute for Economic Researc. 
Gamberoni, E. (2007) Do unilateral trade preferences help export diversification?, HEI Working 
Paper No 17/2007, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva 
Karray, B. (2003) „The Rules of Origin in the Euro-Mediterranean economic space‟ in Euro-
Med Integration and the 'Ring of Friends': The Mediterranean's European Challenge. 
Vol IV, Xuereb, Peter G., Eds. European Documentation and Research Centre. 
Hillberry, R. and Hummels, D. (2008) „Trade Responses to Geographical Frictions: A 
Decomposition Using Micro-Data‟ European Economic Review 52: 527–550. 
Hoekman, B. (1998) „Free trade agreements in the Mediterranean: A regional path towards 
liberalisation‟ The Journal of North African Studies, 2: 89 – 104.  
Hoekman, B. and D. E. Konan (1999) Deep integration, nondiscrimination, and Euro-
Mediterranean free trade, Policy Research Working Paper Series 2130, The World 
Bank.  
Hoekman, B. and D. E. Konan (2005) Deepening Egypt-US trade integration: Economic 
implications of alternative options. 200501, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department 
of Economics. 
 
 
21 
Hummels, D. and Skiba, A. (2004) „Shipping the Good Apples Out? An Empirical 
Confirmation of the Alchian-Allen Conjecture‟, Journal of Political Economy, 6: 1384-
1402. 
Magee, C.S.P. (2008) „New Measures of Trade Creation and Trade Diversion‟, Journal of 
International Economics, 75: 349-362. 
Martinez-Zarzoso, I. (2009) On Transport Costs and Sectoral Trade: Further Evidence for Latin-
American Imports from the European Union, forthcoming in Grabriele Tondl (ed.) 
European Community Studies Association of Austria Publication Series. 
Martinez-Zarzoso, I. and Wilmsmeier, G. (2010) „Determinants of maritime transport costs - a 
panel data analysis‟ Transportation Planning and Technology, 1: 117-136. 
Martínez-Zarzoso, I., Nowak-Lehmann D., F. and Horsewood, N. (2009) „Are Regional Trading 
Agreements Beneficial? Static and Dynamic Panel Gravity Models‟ North American 
Journal of Economics and Finance, 20: 46-65. 
Mayer, T. and Ottaviano, G. I. P. (2007) The Happy Few: New Facts on the Internationalization 
of European Firms, Bruegel-CEPR EFIM 2007 Report, Bruegel Blueprint Series. 
Melitz, M. J. (2003) „The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate 
Industry Productivity‟ Econometrica, 6: 1695–1725. 
Persson, M. and Wilhelmsson, F. (2006) Assessing the Effects of EU Trade Preferences for 
Developing Countreis, Lund University, mimeo. 
Soloaga, I. and Winters, L. A. (2001) „Regionalism in the Nineties: What Effect on Trade?‟ 
North American Journal of Economics and Finance, 1: 1-29. 
Viner J (1950). The customs union issue. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New 
York. 
World Bank (2008). World Development Indicators Database, Washington, US. 
World Factbook (2010). Central Intelligence Agency. US Government.  
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ 
  
 
 
22 
Figure 1. The effect of the Barcelona Process on EuroMed trade 
 
Note: RoW stands for Rest of the World (meaning all the countries outside the Barcelona Process) 
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Table 1. Evolution of trade integration in the Euro-Mediterranean region 
Country   PTA  Med to EU 
 Commitment to the 
Barcelona Process   
Enforcement of the new 
Cooperation Agreement 
 PTA  EU to Med 
 Algeria    1978    1995    2005    2017  
 Egypt    1978    1995    2004    2016  
 Israel   -   1995    2000    1989  
 Jordan    1978    1995    2002    2014  
 Lebanon   1978    1995    2006    2018  
 Libya    1978    2000    no    no   
 Mauritania    1978    1995    no    no   
 Morocco    1978    1995    2000    2012  
 PalestinianTerritories   -   1995*  1997*   2001*   
 Syria    1978    1995    no    no   
 Tunisia    1978    1995    1998    2008   
*The agreement with the Palestinian Authority is a transitory agreement which due to the political situation has not been 
applied. 
Table 2. Summary statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Export Value (€) 14896 8585796 5.84E+07 0 2.29E+09 
Number of Products 14896 8.125 14.494 0 155 
Average Quantity  (Tons) 11496 15084.97 87749.84 0 2122389 
Average Value (€/Ton) 11496 734197.9 3181336 0 1.53E+08 
Average Price (€) 10917 5831.422 43973.53 1.860 1698425 
GDP Exporter (€) 14896 1.41E+12 5.46E+11 4.56E+11 2.48E+12 
GDP Importer (€) 14896 3.63E+10 2.84E+10 5.14E+09 1.18E+11 
GDP per capita Exporter (€) 14896 22651.61 4758.021 11582.06 31243.37 
GDP per capita Importer (€) 14896 1982.827 1084.564 596.2997 5115.409 
Distance  14896 2321.992 962.5492 595.3532 3651.507 
Inputs Imported from EU 14896 8.07E+08 5.71E+08 1.66E+08 2.56E+09 
Inputs imported from ROW 14896 2.05E+08 2.32E+08 3.97E+07 1.21E+09 
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Table 3. Main results for all countries and sectors 
  Xij Nij AVij AQij APij 
lgdpi -0.017 0.036 -0.074 -0.293 0.261*   
 (-0.11) (0.776) (-0.521) (-1.712) (2.362) 
lgdpj 1.931*** 0.163* 1.791*** 1.460*** 0.088 
 (7.731) (2.371) (8.034) (5.329) (0.515) 
Distance -1.158*** -0.382*** -0.774*** -0.990*** 0.244*** 
 (-8.987) (-8.968) (-7.99) (-9.145) (4.828) 
Barcelona process 0.187*** 0.017 0.182*** 0.192*** 0.018 
 (3.532) (1.037) (3.812) (3.377) (0.473) 
Colony 1.450*** 0.542*** 0.907*** 0.775*** 0.053 
 (8.84) (9.988) (7.381) (5.647) (0.839) 
Avlyi 0.776*** 0.212*** 0.589*** 1.003*** -0.483*** 
 (4.277) (3.884) (3.755) (5.382) (-4.177) 
Avlyj -1.563*** 0.289*** -1.864*** -1.980*** 0.384*   
 (-5.275) (3.339) (-7.377) (-6.513) (2.118) 
Constant term -9.245 -15.251*** 5.65 9.416* -3.856*   
  (-1.869) (-9.329) (1.52) (2.253) (-1.974) 
R-squared
 
0.36 0.526 0.355 0.542 0.629 
Number of observations 11480 11496 11480 10917 10917 
LBI 1.471 1.728 1.503 1.488 1.696 
d1 1.112 1.465 1.14 1.116 1.346 
Notes: ***, **, *, indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. T-statistics are in brackets. The 
dependent variable is the natural logarithm of exports in value (current €). Income (Y) and distance (Dist) 
are also in natural logarithms. The estimation uses White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
LBI and d1 denote respectively the Baltagi and Wu and the Bhargava et al tests for autocorrelation, both 
tests reject the null of no first order autocorrelation. 
  
 
 
25 
Table 4. Main results for each product category  
Sector Xij Nij AVij AQij APij 
5 - Chemicals and related products 0.287* 0.065* 0.241*   0.274* -0.115 
 
(2.258) (1.676) (2.039) (1.927) (-1.28) 
6 - Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material 0.157* -0.025 0.156* 0.145 0.06 
 
(1.542) (-0.749) (1.712) (1.251) (0.876) 
7 - Machinery and transport equipment 0.104 -0.021 0.121 0.095 -0.032 
 
(1.03) (-0.728) (1.341) (0.923) (-0.407) 
8 - Miscellaneous manufactured articles 0.089 -0.001 0.077 0.071 0.053 
  (0.984) (-0.045) (0.97) (0.76) (0.726) 
Notes: ***, **, *, indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. T-statistics are in brackets. The 
dependent variable is the natural logarithm of exports in value (current €). Income, population and distance 
are also in natural logarithms. The estimation uses White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors.  
Table 5. Main results for each country. 
 Countries Xij Nij AVij AQij APij 
Algeria 0.280* 0.066* 0.213* 0.232 -0.084 
 
(2.296) (1.957) (1.953) (1.649) (-0.969) 
Egypt 0.249** 0.175*** 0.143* 0.519*** -0.430*** 
 
(2.972) (7.877) (1.862) (5.724) (-8.057) 
Jordan 0.025 0.05 -0.009 -0.291* 0.131 
 
(0.19) (1.371) (-0.082) (-2.039) (1.274) 
Lebanon 0.055 0.000 0.075 0.020 0.076 
 
(0.545) (0.000) (0.837) (0.160) (0.922) 
Morocco 0.281*** 0.156*** 0.188*   0.281** -0.064 
 
(3.354) (6.749) (2.407) (3.083) (-1.117) 
Tunisia 0.545*** 0.167*** 0.444*** 0.501*** -0.152*   
  (5.312) (5.332) (4.798) (4.806) (-2.159) 
Notes: ***, **, *, indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. T-statistics are in brackets. The 
dependent variable is the natural logarithm of exports in value (current €). Income, population and distance 
are also in natural logarithms. The estimation uses White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors.  
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Table 6. Results extended model  
 Xij Nij AVij AQij APij 
lgdpi -0.104 0.026 -0.158 -0.286 0.127 
 (-0.641) (0.544) (-1.083) (-1.637) (1.104) 
lgdpj 1.950*** 0.168* 1.809*** 1.529*** 0.045 
 (7.818) (2.458) (8.124) (5.585) (0.259) 
Distance -1.033*** -0.307*** -0.715*** -1.019*** 0.316**  
 (-6.347) (-4.618) (-5.615) (-5.724) (2.74) 
D_cumulation 0.107* 0.008 0.096* 0.148* -0.077* 
 (1.942) (0.459) (1.93) (2.483) (-1.886) 
Pan_EuroMed_RoO 0.054 0.053* 0.028 -0.008 -0.004 
 (0.811) (2.469) (0.473) (-0.105) (-0.074) 
linput_eu 0.074 0.027 0.068 -0.134 0.168*   
 (0.723) (0.818) (0.746) (-1.197) (2.199) 
linput_row -0.210*** -0.107*** -0.111*   -0.096 -0.021 
 (-3.311) (-5.103) (-1.986) (-1.374) (-0.435) 
Colony 1.395*** 0.502*** 0.893*** 0.788*** 0.03 
 (7.069) (6.131) (5.878) (3.651) (0.219) 
Avlyi 0.984*** 0.286*** 0.716*** 1.211*** -0.495*** 
 (4.851) (4.303) (4.096) (5.502) (-3.494) 
Avlyj -1.651*** 0.269* -1.946*** -2.147*** 0.453*   
 (-5.253) (2.561) (-7.299) (-6.237) (2.078) 
Constant term -7.672 -14.691*** 6.896 11.095 -3.818 
 (-1.3) (-6) (1.517) (1.712) (-0.917) 
R-squared 0.159 0.121 0.129 0.115 0.046 
Number of observations 11480 11496 11480 10917 10917 
      
      
Notes: ***, **, *, indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. T-statistics are in brackets. The 
dependent variable is the natural logarithm of exports in value (current €). Income (Y) and distance (Dist) 
are also in natural logarithms. The estimation uses White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors.  
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Table 7. Extended model with dyadic fixed effect and country-sector-and-time 
effects 
  Xij Nij AVij AQij APij 
D_cumulation 0.490* -0.008 0.369 0.115 0.107 
  (1.815) (-0.064) (1.451) (0.43) (0.588) 
Pan_EuroMed_RoO 1.031*** 0.192* 1.060*** 0.666 -0.083 
  (2.839) (1.786) (3.273) (1.19) (-0.205) 
linput_eu 0.687 0.548*** 0.586 -0.439 0.235 
  (1.104) (3.054) (1.003) (-0.555) (0.506) 
linput_row -0.332 -0.261* -0.278 -0.701 0.02 
  (-0.779) (-1.898) (-0.688) (-1.545) (0.078) 
Constant term 4.349 -4.648 3.8 26.289** 1.263 
  (0.393) (-1.052) (0.361) (2.363) (0.171) 
R-squared 0.166 0.162 0.135 0.117 0.076 
r2_o 0.108 0.062 0.084 0.000 0.018 
Number of observations 11480 11496 11480 10917 10917 
Log likelihood -18382.37 -4994.024 -17230.73 -18097.89 -13746.04 
RMSE 1.228183 0.3823821 1.110954 1.301194 0.8734121 
AIC 37804.74 11028.05 35501.47 37235.77 28532.08 
BIC 41625.89 14849.92 39322.62 41030.77 32327.08 
Notes: ***, **, *, indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. T-statistics are in brackets. The 
dependent variable is the natural logarithm of exports in value (current €). Income (Y) and distance (Dist) 
are also in natural logarithms. The estimation uses White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors 
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Table 8. Sectoral results extended model 
  
Xij Nij AVij AQij APij 
Sector 5 D_cumulation 0.251* 0.068* 0.196* 0.290* -0.145 
   
 
(1.904) (1.685) (1.598) (1.975) (-1.551) 
   Pan_EuroMed_RoO -0.159 0.074* -0.185 -0.296 0.107 
   
 
(-1.015) (1.459) (-1.267) (-1.714) (0.949) 
   linput_eu -0.235 -0.022 -0.176 -0.367 0.201 
   
 
(-0.926) (-0.279) (-0.747) (-1.28) (1.112) 
   linput_row -0.101 -0.013 -0.109 -0.258 -0.001 
   
 
(-0.64) (-0.29) (-0.749) (-1.406) (-0.006) 
Sector 6 D_cumulation 0.176* 0.023 0.152* 0.146 0.004 
   
 
(1.678) (0.657) (1.622) (1.224) (0.05) 
   Pan_EuroMed_RoO -0.073 0.034 -0.072 -0.069 -0.024 
   
 
(-0.588) (0.811) (-0.654) (-0.492) (-0.277) 
   linput_eu 0.101 0.056 0.038 -0.095 0.177 
   
 
(0.524) (0.856) (0.224) (-0.437) (0.39) 
   linput_row -0.226* -0.171*** -0.061 0.037 -0.112 
   
 
(-1.897) (-4.161) (-0.591) (0.283) (-1.504) 
Sector 7 D_cumulation 0.005 -0.016 0.015 0.097 -0.114 
   
 
(0.049) (-0.516) (0.152) (0.896) (-1.394) 
   Pan_EuroMed_RoO 0.189 0.064* 0.141 0.167 -0.072 
   
 
(1.44) (1.652) (1.195) (1.255) (-0.701) 
   linput_eu 0.221 0.103* 0.181 -0.105 0.277 
   
 
(1.131) (1.772) (1.046) (-0.522) (1.804) 
   linput_row -0.149 -0.093* -0.068 -0.075 -0.01 
   
 
(-1.265) (-2.536) (-0.669) (-0.619) (-0.103) 
Sector 8 D_cumulation 0.014 0 0.028 0.113 -0.045 
   
 
(0.145) (0.013) (0.332) (1.156) (-0.591) 
   Pan_EuroMed_RoO 0.207* 0.058 0.181* 0.152 0.019 
   
 
(1.841) (1.438) (1.817) (1.305) (0.203) 
   linput_eu 0.246 -0.018 0.344* 0.241 0.01 
   
 
(1.453) (-0.301) (2.301) (1.369) (0.076) 
   linput_row -0.287** -0.133*** -0.227* -0.245* 0.05 
   
 
(-2.678) (-3.435) (-2.439) (-2.229) (0.592) 
Notes: ***, **, *, indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. T-statistics are in brackets. The 
dependent variable is the natural logarithm of exports in value (current €). Income (Y) and distance (Dist) 
are also in natural logarithms. The estimation uses White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors.  
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Appendix 
Table A.1. Main exports commodities and main partners  
Algeria  
Commodities: Petroleum, natural gas, and petroleum products 97% 
Partners: US 23.9%, Italy 14.9%, Spain 11.1%, Canada 9.6%, France 8.6%, Netherlands 4.5% (2008) 
Morocco  
Commodities: Clothing and textiles, electric components, inorganic chemicals, transistors, crude minerals, 
fertilizers 
 (including phosphates), petroleum products, citrus fruits, vegetables, fish 
Partners: Spain 18.7%, France 17.1%, Brazil 6.9%, US 4.4%, Belgium 4.3%, Italy 4.2% (2008) 
Tunisia  
Commodities: Clothing, semi-finished goods and textiles, agricultural products, mechanical goods, phosphates 
and chemicals, 
 hydrocarbons, electrical equipment 
Partners: France 28.4%, Italy 18%, Germany 9.6%, Libya 5.8%, Spain 5% (2008) 
Egypt   
Commodities: Crude oil and petroleum products, cotton, textiles, metal products, chemicals, processed food 
Partners: Italy 9.5%, US 7.1%, Spain 6.2%, India 6%, Syria 4.7%, Saudi Arabia 4.6%, Japan 4.5%,  
Germany 4.5% (2008) 
Jordan  
Commodities: Clothing, fertilizers, potash, phosphates, vegetables, pharmaceuticals 
Partners: India 16.2%, Iraq 16.1%, US 13.1%, Saudi Arabia 6.9%, United Arab Emirates 4.6% (2008) 
Lebanon  
Commodities: Jewelry, base metals, chemicals, miscellaneous consumer goods, fruit and vegetables, tobacco,  
construction minerals, electric power machinery and switchgear, textile fibers, paper 
Partners: Switzerland 22%, United Arab Emirates 10%, Iraq 8%, Saudi Arabia 7%, Syria 6% (2009 est.) 
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Table A.2. SITC 2 Classification 
5 - Chemicals and related products, n.e.s. 
 51 - Organic chemicals 
 52 - Inorganic chemicals 
 53 - Dyeing, tanning and colouring materials 
 54 - Medicinal and pharmaceutical products 
 55 - Essential oils and resinoids and perfume materials; toilet, polishing and cleansing preparations 
 56 - Fertilizers (other than those of group 272) 
 57 - Plastics in primary forms 
 58 - Plastics in non-primary forms 
  59 - Chemical materials and products, n.e.s. 
6 - Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material 
 61 - Leather, leather manufactures, n.e.s., and dressed furskins 
 62 - Rubber manufactures, n.e.s. 
 63 - Cork and wood manufactures (excluding furniture) 
 64 - Paper, paperboard and articles of paper pulp, of paper or of paperboard 
 65 - Textile yarn, fabrics, made-up articles, n.e.s., and related products 
 66 - Non-metallic mineral manufactures, n.e.s. 
 67 - Iron and steel 
 68 - Non-ferrous metals 
  69 - Manufactures of metals, n.e.s. 
7 - Machinery and transport equipment 
 71 - Power-generating machinery and equipment 
 72 - Machinery specialized for particular industries 
 73 - Metalworking machinery 
 74 - General industrial machinery and equipment, n.e.s., and machine parts, n.e.s. 
 75 - Office machines and automatic data-processing machines 
 76 - Telecommunications and sound-recording and reproducing apparatus and equipment 
 
77 - Electrical machinery, apparatus and appliances, n.e.s., and electrical parts thereof (including non-electrical 
counterparts, n.e.s., of electrical household-type equipment) 
 78 - Road vehicles (including air-cushion vehicles) 
  79 - Other transport equipment 
8 - Miscellaneous manufactured articles 
 81 - Prefabricated buildings; sanitary, plumbing, heating and lighting fixtures and fittings, n.e.s. 
 
82 - Furniture, and parts thereof; bedding, mattresses, mattress supports, cushions and similar stuffed 
furnishings 
 83 - Travel goods, handbags and similar containers 
 84 - Articles of apparel and clothing accessories 
 85 – Footwear 
 87 - Professional, scientific and controlling instruments and apparatus, n.e.s. 
 88 - Photographic apparatus, equipment and supplies and optical goods, n.e.s.; watches and clocks 
 89 - Miscellaneous manufactured articles, n.e.s. 
Source: United Nations, 2009. 
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Table A.3. Variable descriptions and sources of data. 
Dependent Variables Description Source 
Xij : Exports from i to j Nominal X Eurostat 
Nij : Extensive Margin 
Number of type of products exported 
from i t j  
Eurostat 
AVij : Intensive Margin 
Average Value of the products exported 
from i to j  
Eurostat 
AQij : Average Quantity 
Average Quantity of the products 
exported from i to j 
Eurostat 
APij : Average Price 
Average Price of the products exported 
from i to j 
Eurostat 
Independent Variables Description Source 
GDPi : Exporter’s income Exporter’s GDP, PPP (current $) WDI 
GDPj : Importer’s income Importer’s GDP, PPP (current $) WDI 
PTA dummy 
Dummy variable = 1 if the trading 
partners have an PTA, 0 otherwise 
European Commission 
D_cumulation  
Dummy variable = 1 if the RoO allow 
diagonal cumulation with the other 
MENA countries 
European Commission 
Pan_EuroMed_RoO 
Dummy variable = 1 if the countries has 
adopted Pan EuroMed RoO 
European Commission 
Input_EUi 
Import value of machinery from four 
European Economies (current $) 
OECD 
Input_RoWi 
Import value of machinery from the 
Rest of the World (current $) 
OECD 
Distij : Distance 
Distances between country capitals of 
trading partners (km) 
CEPII  
Colonyij :  
Dummy variable = 1 if the trading 
partners had colonial links in the past, 0 
otherwise 
CEPII  
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Table A.4. Cumulation Rules 
Mediterranean Countries 
Preferential arrangement  Rules of origin/cumulation  
Algeria (01.09.2005) 
Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement, OJ L 265, 
10.10.2005 
Protocol No 6  
OJ L 297 of 15.11.2007 
Bilateral, diagonal and full cumulation 
Tunisia (01.03.1998)  
Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement , OJ L 97, 
30.03.1998, p.2.  
Protocol No 4  
OJ L 260 of 21.9.2006 
Bilateral, diagonal and full cumulation  
Morocco (01.03.2000)  
Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement, OJ L 70, 
18.03.2000, p.2 
Protocol No 4  
OJ L 336 of 21.12.2005 
Bilateral, diagonal and full cumulation 
Israel (01.06.2000)  
Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement , OJ L 147, 
21.06.2000, p.3 
Protocol No 4  
OJ L 20 of 24.1.2006 
Bilateral and diagonal cumulation 
Palestinian Authority of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 
(01.07.1997)  
Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement , OJ L 
187, 16.07.1997, p.3.  
Protocol No 3  
OJ L 187 of 16.07.1997 
Bilateral cumulation 
Egypt (01.06.2004)  
Mediterranean Association Agreement, OJ L304 of 
30.09.2004, p.39 
Protocol No 4  
OJ L 73 of 13.3.2006 
Bilateral and diagonal cumulation 
Jordan (01.05.2002)  
Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement, OJ L 129, 
15.05.2002, p.3.  
Protocol No 3  
OJ L 209 of 31.7.2006 
Bilateral and diagonal cumulation 
Lebanon (01.03.2003 Interim Agreement)  
Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement, OJ L 143, 
30.05.2006, p.2.  
Protocol No 4  
OJ L 143, 30.05.2006, p. 73 
Bilateral cumulation 
Syria (01.07.1977)  
Cooperation Agreement, OJ L 269, 27.09.1978, p.2.  
Protocol No 2  
Bilateral cumulation 
Source: 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/customs/customs_duties/rules_origin/preferential/article_779_en.htm#paneuro. 
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Table A.5: Results for all countries and sectors with dyadic-sectoral fixed effects 
 
Xij Nij AVij AQij APij 
Barcelona process 0.226*** 0.102*** 0.159*** 0.233*** -0.113*** 
 
5.416 8.318 4.247 5.088 -3.764 
lgdpi 0.184 0.130*** 0.076 -0.211 0.166*   
 
(1.674) (4.042) (0.771) (-1.752) (2.112) 
lgdpj 0.134 -0.112*** 0.223**  0.244* 0.111 
 
(1.406) (-4.024) (2.619) (2.344) (1.632) 
Constant term 4.507*** 1.662*** 2.924*** 2.902*** -0.596*** 
 
(32.083) (22.868) (22.281) (19.916) (-4.665) 
R-squared 0.092 0.009 0.105 0.008 0.118 
Number of observations 10507 10523 10507 9951 9951 
Log likelihood -16218.33 -4884.70 -15202.79 -15976.40 -12562.47 
RMSE 1.13 0.38 1.03 1.21 0.86 
AIC 32444.67 9777.40 30413.57 31960.79 25132.94 
BIC 32473.71 9806.45 30442.61 31989.62 25161.76 
Notes: ***, **, *, indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. T-statistics are in brackets. The 
dependent variable is the natural logarithm of exports in value (current €). Income (Y) and distance (Dist) 
are also in natural logarithms. The estimation uses White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors.  
 
Table A.6: Results for all countries and sectors with exporter-year and importer-year 
and dyadic fixed effects 
 
Xij Nij AVij AQij APij 
Barcelona process 0.960** 0.012 0.741* -0.068 -0.085 
 
(3) (0.157) (2.496) (-0.201) (-0.335) 
Constant term 12.298*** 1.552*** 10.805*** 4.180*** 6.442*** 
 
(129.25) (42.904) (126.712) (30.824) (65.695) 
R-squared 0.122 0.11 0.091 0.073 0.027 
Number of observations 11480 11496 11480 10917 10917 
Log likelihood -18676.33 -5340.53 -17511.75 -18361.22 -14028.99 
RMSE 1.24 0.39 1.12 1.31 0.88 
AIC 37612.66 10941.06 35283.51 36982.43 28317.99 
BIC 38567.94 11896.52 36238.79 37931.18 29266.74 
Notes: ***, **, *, indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. T-statistics are in brackets. The 
dependent variable is the natural logarithm of exports in value (current €). Income (Y) and distance (Dist) 
are also in natural logarithms. The estimation uses White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors.  
 
